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Abstract
This paper considers the impact of di¤erences in endogenous technological change
between two countries on global pollution emissions under international strategic
interaction in environmental policies. A country that initially has a dirty tech-
nology (an environmentally lagging country) reduces more pollution emissions by
imposing a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission, although
it may generate larger total emissions. The more a country reduces pollutants,
the more it learns how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner at low
cost. The main nding is that an environmentally lagging countrys technology
may continue to advance through a learning-by-doing e¤ect until it exceeds the
environmental friendliness of a leading country that initially had the cleanest tech-
nology. Whether a country eventually becomes an environmentally leading country
depends on the country size and its awareness of environmental quality.
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1 Introduction
A strengthening of environmental regulations that are intended to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions often induces environmentally friendly technological progress as a by-product
(Newell et al. 1999, Popp 2002).1 While technological progress itself is good for the
environment, it might ultimately increase the total pollution emissions in the world by
triggering international interactions on environmental regulations such as so-called carbon
leakage. Carbon leakage refers to the situation in which a reduction in carbon dioxide
emissions by the home country with a strict climate policy causes an emissions increase
in the foreign country that weakens its environmental restriction as a response, which
might not only increase the total emissions in the short run but also slow the pace of
climate policy-driven technological progress in the foreign country. As a result, the total
emissions in the international economy might be higher also in the long run. The present
paper proposes a new dynamic model that explicitly capture such an international and
intertemporal interaction between environmental regulations that governs technological
progress and examines its consequences on pollution emissions in each country.
For this purpose, we develop a two-country dynamic model in which the government
in each country determines domestic environmental regulations and the rms respond
to it by determining the scale of pollution reduction. There is a unique nal good that
generates transboundary pollution (greenhouse gas) as a by-product of production. In
order to mitigate pollution damage, the national government requires each domestic rm
to reduce its emissions, which induces environmentally friendly technological progress
according to the nding by Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002). We follow Arrow
(1962) and Romer (1986) by assuming technological progress results from learning by
doing, which takes place as a by-product of the rmsexperiences on emission reduction.
A key mechanism in our model is that an environmental policy in one country induces
domestic rmsadoption of cleaner technologies, which may discourage the other coun-
trys incentive for a stricter environmental policy. A less strict environmental policy in
the other country should stie the process of technological progress through learning by
doing. In other words, the strategic interaction between countries might hamper long-
term technological progress, which has a negative impact on the environment. To the best
of our knowledge, this mechanism of international strategic interaction on environmental
regulations is new to the literature on the environment and endogenous technological
progress. The present paper could complement the existing studies by o¤ering a new
model incorporating that mechanism.
Using the model, we demonstrate that environmental leadership of a country may
shift to the other along an equilibrium path.2 Environmental leadership is dened as the
state whereby a country has the most environmentally friendly technology on pollution
emissions. The intuition is the following. As each country is assumed to regulate its
1More environmentally friendly technologies are widely recognized as a key component of the long-
term strategy to mitigate global greenhouse gas emissions without compromising economic growth. As
is well known, in order to control and limit climate change, long-term greenhouse gas emissions need to
be reduced. According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012),
without new policies, by 2050, global greenhouse gas emissions will increase by more than 50% compared
with the 2010 emissions, primarily due to a 70% growth in energy-related CO2 emissions. As a result,
the average global temperature is projected to be 3-C to 6-C higher than preindustrial levels by the end
of the century, which exceeds the globally agreed goal of limiting it to 2-C to prevent disruptive climate
change. See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014).
2This theoretical result seems consistent with empirical observations; see Section 4.2.
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emissions to maximize individual welfare, a country that initially has a dirty technology
(an environmentally lagging country) needs to reduce more pollution emissions. The en-
vironmentally lagging country tends to impose a higher rate of pollution reduction per
unit of the emission and reduce more pollution emissions, although it may generate a
large amount of pollution emissions (i.e., implementing a weak environmental regulation
in terms of emissions per unit of the good). This is realized as a result of international
strategic interaction emerging in Nash equilibrium of the policy game. Consequently,
learning-by-doing e¤ects are large in the lagging country and its technology becomes en-
vironmentally friendly more rapidly than the other country that initially had a clean tech-
nology (an environmentally leading country). Thus, the lagging countrys environmental
friendliness may continue to increase until it exceeds the leading countrys environmen-
tal friendliness. Each countrys friendliness converges to a certain level in the long run
because the government ceases to implement environmental regulations when its tech-
nology is su¢ ciently clean. We can show that whether a country eventually becomes an
environmentally leading country depends on country size and awareness of environmental
quality.
The result that the leadership may endogenously uctuate is not new in the context of
price competition between rms. For instance, the important paper by Giovannetti (2001)
considers a duopoly in which rms considering innite technological adoption set prices
with Bertrand competition in the product market. Using this model, Giovannetti iden-
ties the conditions whereby rms alternate in adopting the new technology. He shows
that demand conditions, such as price elasticities, play a role in determining whether
such leapfrogging can be perpetual in Bertrand competition.3 In addition, some studies
in the eld of economic geography address both the theory of and empirical evidence
for the possibility of leadership reversals between regions (for example, Quah 1996a, b).4
Di¤erent from the context of price competition, the present paper assumes that rms are
perfectly competitive as in the standard endogenous growth model based on learning by
doing (Romer 1986). Thus, there is no strategic interaction between rms but between
international governments.5
Another result we obtain from the model is that whether global pollution emissions
decrease over time is ambiguous, despite the fact that environmental technology monoton-
ically advances in both countries. More specically, the amount of global pollution emis-
sions converges to a constant level in the long run, which may be lower (higher) than the
initial level of global emissions (i.e., the level in an early stage of adjustment under dirty
technologies) when environmental leadership shifts between countries (does not shift) on
an equilibrium path. In our model, the technology in the lagging country advances more
rapidly than that in the leading country. This feature implies that technologies in the
two countries advance considerably if both countries experience a state of environmental
lagging for many periods. That is, both countries possess similarly clean technologies
when the environmental leadership shifts internationally. This is why the long-term level
of global pollution can become low in the case of leadership reversals.
Our results could suggest the importance of balanced technological change, while it
3See Athreye and Godley (2009), Giovannetti (2013), and Petrakos, Rodríguez-Pose, and Rovolis
(2005) for more recent research.
4Some papers in trade theory also address similar issues to this. See Furukawa (2015) for recent
research.
5See, for example, Hall (2008) and Harrington, Iskhakov, Rust, and Schjerning (2010) for research on
dynamic strategic interaction between rms in the competitive process.
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should be safe to keep in mind that we are only seeing the learning-by-doing aspect of
technological progress. Most of the worlds technological progress for the environment
occurs in high-income countries (e.g., Lanjouw and Mody, 1996). Dechezleprêtre et al.
(2011) did nd climate-friendly innovations in emerging economies, but these innovations
are limited. While international transfers of climate-mitigation technologies occur mostly
between developed countries, technology transfers from developed countries to emerging
countries are few in number, but have been rising rapidly in recent years.6 We might
need to accelerate international transfers to mitigate the imbalanced technological change
between countries that could cause undesirable e¤ects on the environment.
By developing a two-country model of endogenous environmental regulations and
learning by doing, this paper complements the literature on environmental regulations
and endogenous technological change through research and development (R&D). Boven-
berg and Smulders (1996) examined the link between tighter environmental policy and
economic growth when the environmental R&D sector endogenously develops abatement
technologies. Goulder and Mathai (2000) explored policy-induced technological change
for the design of carbon-abatement policies when the channels of technological progress
are based on R&D and learning-by-doing. Laurent-Lucchetti and Leach (2011) inves-
tigated induced technological change in the emissions e¢ ciency through investments in
R&D under generational heterogeneity. Acemoglu et al. (2012) considered whether re-
search can be directed to improving the productivity of clean and dirty intermediate goods
sectors and showed that sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with temporary tax-
ation of dirty innovation and production when the inputs are su¢ ciently substitutable.
Bosetti et al. (2008) and Fischer and Newell (2008) empirically assessed the e¤ects of
technological progress through learning, R&D, and knowledge spillovers. None of these
studies developed a two-country model to study the strategic interaction of environmental
policies between countries and its e¤ects on technological progress and global pollution
dynamics.7
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our two-country
model of environmental regulations and Section 3 considers a Nash equilibrium of the
policy game. Section 4 explores an equilibrium path of each countrys environmental
leadership. Section 5 investigates the dynamics of global pollution emissions. Section 6
concludes.
2 Basic Model
Time is discrete extending from t = 0 to1: There are two countries, labeled by i = A; B:
In the basic model, we keep the two countries as symmetric as possible. They di¤er only
6Popp (2012) provided a comprehensive review of the literature on environmentally friendly techno-
logical change and technology transfers.
7In the literature on trade and the environment, the interaction of environmental policy interventions
is investigated using a two-country model, but technologies are exogenously given to focus on the e¤ects
of trade liberalization. See, e.g., Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Fredriksson and Matschke (2015).
Andrew and Pecchenino (1997) considered the strategic choice of environmental policies in a two-country
model with intergenerational e¤ects. Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri, and Michael (2005) examined pollution
abatement activities undertaken by both private producers and the public sector in two countries. These
studies focused on the interaction of environmental polices between countries but not on technological
change.
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in initial environmental technological levels.8 There is a single consumption good, which
is taken as the numeraire. The consumption good is produced by perfectly competitive
rms in both countries. There are constant returns to scale, and the technology converts
one unit of (e¤ective) labor into one unit of a good. The (gross) marginal cost in country
i is thus equal to the wage rate, denoted as wi(t):
Industrial production emits pollution, which is treated as a global pure public bad.
Assume that producing one unit of a good in country i generates i(t) > 0 units of
pollution. The variable i(t) captures how harmful the production technology in country
i is to the environment. We model a countrys environmental technology by using i(t),
which may correspond to the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per unit of GDP
adjusted by PPP in a commonly-used data set of the United Nations (the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) Indicators), given that we think of a single-good model.
In this paper, we use two di¤erent words concerning the environment. The rst word
is awareness,to which we relate parameter ": This captures how uncomfortable people
feel about global pollutants. The second word is friendliness,inversely relating to i(t):
This captures to what extent the production technology of a country generates pollution
emissions.
In this study, we highlight the governments role in controlling emissions. In order to
control the aggregate emission level, the national government of country i requires each
domestic rm to reduce its pollution by 100  i(t) %: In other words, rms in country i
are allowed to generate i(t)(1   i(t)) of emissions for one unit of the good. We assume
that every rm can reduce one unit of emission by hiring one unit of (e¤ective) labor.
The e¤ective marginal cost for a rm to produce a unit of a good (with the inclusion of
pollution reduction) is equal to wi(t)(1 + i(t) i(t)): We may refer to  i(t) 2 [0; 1] as the
rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission in country i:
In each country, there is a representative consumer who inelastically supplies L=2
units of (e¤ective) labor. The consumer in country i consumes Ci(t) units of the single
consumption good and is endowed with the following utility function:
ui(t) = Ci(t)  " (EA(t) + EB(t))2 ; (1)
where Ei(t) is the ow of pollution emission generated by country i and " > 0 denotes
the degree of environmental awareness.
We treat pollution as a ow although most environmental problems are stock ones.
The reason is as follows. First, if the depreciation rate of the pollution stock is high (e.g.,
the natural rate of removal of atmospheric pollution is high), the ow assumption may
be a reasonable approximation (e.g., Schou, 2002; Grimaud and Tournemaine, 2007).
Second, it simplies the analysis without altering the main insight of our paper.
3 Short-run Equilibrium
In this section, we will characterize the short-run equilibrium of our model under given
environmental technologies. Although our model is very simple, its equilibrium behavior
appears to be complex. To explain this, rst, we will see the consumers and rms
optimal activities in market equilibrium. Then, we will characterize the governments
optimal environmental policy in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game played by the two
countries.
8In Section 4.3, we will investigate the roles of heterogeneity between the countries.
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3.1 Market Equilibrium
Assuming that rms of the two countries supply their products to the integrated world
market, the e¤ective marginal costs must be equated between the two countries. Thus
we have wA(t) (1 + A(t)A(t)) = wB(t) (1 + B(t)B(t)) = 1: The equilibrium wages are
obtained as
wi(t) =
1
1 + i(t) i(t)
: (2)
The labor market equilibrium conditions determine the equilibrium levels of national
output equal to
Yi(t) =
L=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
: (3)
We thus obtain the indirect utility function as
ui(t) =
L=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
  "
0@ X
i2fA;Bg
Ei(t)
1A2 ; (4)
where the pollution is given by
Ei(t) = (1   i(t)) Li(t)=2
1 + i(t) i(t)
(5)
for i = A and B:
3.2 Optimal Policy Equilibrium
The government in each country, say i; controls their pollution reduction rate  i(t) as an
environmental policy tool so as to maximize utility, given their foreign policy  j(t): A
reaction function is dened as  i (t; 

j(t)) = argmax i(t)2[0;1] ui(t): Solving this nonlinear
optimization problem with (4) derives the reaction function as
 i (t; 

j(t)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if "L  1
1+i(t)

i(t) +
j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
 1
ei(t) otherwise
1 if "L  1
1+i(t)

j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
 1 ; (6)
where
ei(t) =
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"L

"L+

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"L
 : (7)
Equation (6) suggests a possibility of so-called carbon leakage. Since  i (t; 

j(t)) is
globally a decreasing function in  j(t); one country would prefer a lower rate of pollution
reduction when the other country takes a higher pollution reduction rate. Thus, it is less
likely for both countries to take a very high rate of reduction at the same time. At the
aggregate level, this would imply the possibility of carbon leakage.
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Next let us think of a Nash equilibrium in the policy game played between the two
governments. Denote as ( A(t); 

B(t)) a pair of strategies taken in the Nash equilibrium.
This equilibrium pair of policies can be calculated as a solution to the system consisting of
the two optimal policy equations:  A(t) = 

A(t; 

B(t)) and 

B(t) = 

B(t; 

A(t)): To derive
the equilibrium policies, rst, it is useful to note two basic facts. First, ( A(t); 

B(t)) =
(1; 1) and ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (eA(t); eB(t)) cannot be Nash equilibria.
9 Second, if the world
pollution level A(t)+B(t) is su¢ ciently low, both countries do not adopt any pollution
reduction policy:
( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) if A(t) + B(t) < min
i2fA;Bg

1
"L (1 + i(t))

: (8)
By using (6) and (7), we can easily obtain the equilibrium pair of the policy in the
following; see Appendix A for detailed derivations. Dene ^ such that ^ = 1=("L (1 + ^)).
With i 6= j; the policy pair is characterized by
( i (t); 

j(t)) =
8>>><>>>:
(pi(t); 0) if
min
n
i(t);
1
"L(1+i(t))
o
> j(t)  1"L(1+i(t))   i(t)
(1; 0) if ^ > j(t) > 1"L(1+i(t))
(1; qj(t)) if i(t) > j(t)  ^
; (9)
where we dene two functions in t; pi(t) and qj(t); that satisfy 0 < qi(t) < pj(t) < 1:
Formal denitions of these two functions are
pi(t) 
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
 "Lj(t)

"L+

1
1+i(t)
 "Lj(t)
 and qj(t)  "L 
1
j(t)
1
1+j(t)
"L+ 1
1+j(t)
: (10)
By using (8) and (9) with (10), Figure 1 relates the environmental technologies of both
countries, (A(t); B(t)); to their equilibrium pollution reduction rates, ( A(t); 

B(t)); in
(8) and (9). These complex equations and gures simply imply that the country that
has a dirtier technology (larger i(t)) is more willing to impose a higher rate of pollution
reduction per unit of the emission (larger  i(t)). We can formally prove our main result.
Theorem 1 A country with a less environmentally friendly technology tends to imple-
ment a higher rate of pollution reduction per unit of the emission generated in the country
in equilibrium;  i (t)   j(t) if i(t) > j(t):
Theorem 1 implies that the government of a country with dirtier technologies would
prefer to reduce more pollutants in percentage terms. This results from international
strategic interactions emerging in a Nash equilibrium of the policy game. This will
deliver the results on environmental leadership and global pollution dynamics as shown
in the next two sections.
One may think that the implication of Theorem 1 seems inconsistent with recent
empirical literature showing that new technologies lower the cost of regulation and in-
crease the willingness to regulate (e.g., Carrion-Flores and Innes, 2010; Lovely and Popp,
2011). However, we believe that these two seemingly opposite views are not necessarily
9The proof is as follows. Substituting ej(t) into ei(t) results in
i (t)
i(t)
+ 1

i(t)
2"(1+i(t))
  j(t)2"(1+j(t))

= 0: This does not hold in general because i (t) > 0:
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inconsistent but just seeing two di¤erent aspects of environmental technology. On the
one hand, the empirical literature focuses on a cost reduction of environmental regulation
driven by new technologies, which encourages the willingness to regulate as shown. On
the other hand, we are currently seeing new technologies to reduce the potential amount
of pollution emissions, which can be expressed by a decrease in i(t): The reduction of po-
tential pollution directly decreases the need to regulate itself, which would subsequently
weaken the willingness for a country to regulate pollution emissions. Our model captures
this aspect of environmental technology, which is essentially consistent with the way the
empirical literature considers.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the amount of pollution emissions per unit of
the good within a country, i, i.e., i(t) (1   i (t)) ; can be greater when the technology
of country i is dirtier (less environmentally friendly), i.e., i(t) is higher, although it is
accompanied by a higher reduction rate  i (t) per unit of the emission. This suggests
that, in our model, a country with a less environmentally friendly technology tends to
implement a weaker environmental regulation in terms of emissions per unit of the good,
which is consistent with the empirical literature mentioned above.
4 Technological Leadership in the Environment
In this section, we will introduce a learning-by-doing process through which the environ-
mental technology in either country advances. To begin with, we dene environmental
technological leadership as the state whereby a given country has the most environmen-
tally friendly technology among all countries. Thus, we refer to a country that has a lower
i(t) as an environmentally leading country. A country with a higher i(t) is called an
environmentally lagging country. Without loss of generality, we assume A(0) < B(0)
holds in period 0 (initial period). Country A is initially an environmentally leading
country.
4.1 Learning by Doing and Technological Progress
In order to incorporate the basic idea that environmental regulations induce environmen-
tally friendly technological progress (Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002)), we consider
the learning by doing setting à la Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986);10 however, if we
thought of a more general and realistic setting as in Youngs (1991) bounded learning by
doing model, our main result would not change qualitatively. We believe that using such
a simple setting is benecial for us to elaborate our main story.
The key assumption is that a country that reduces more pollutants learns how to
produce in a more environmentally friendly manner. Specically, we suppose that the
pollution level of a technology in country i in period t+1; i(t+1); is determined by the
cumulative stock of past experiences on reducing pollutants:
i(t+ 1) = i  
tX
s=0
( i (s)i(s)Yi(s)); (11)
10See also Furukawa (2007) for learning by doing in an innovation-based growth model, which is
considered in much the same fashion as Arrows original paper.
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where  i (s)i(s)Yi(s) is the pollution reduction made by country i in period s and 
is a learning-by-doing function that maps the pollution reduction country i does in a
period, s; to how much country i will learn to produce environmentally friendly from
its experience on reducing pollutants. i denotes an initial (period 0) pollution level in
country i, which is exogenously given. We put two natural assumptions on the learning-
by-doing function . (a) (0) = 0; there is no advance in a country if there is no reduction.
(b) (z0) > (z) for z0 > z for any z; z0 > 0; a country that reduces more pollutants
learns more on how to produce in an environmentally friendly manner. It can be easily
veried that, in equilibrium,  i (s)i(s)Yi(s) monotonically increases with 

i (s), which
plays a key role in showing the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium dynamics of the international environmental friendliness (A(t); B(t))
have seven di¤erent phases as shown in Figure 2.11
Proof. For the sake of explanation, by (11), we can derive the following expression in
terms of a ow:
i(t+ 1)  i(t) =  ( i (t)i(t)Yi(t)): (12)
Together with Figure 1, (12) implies that there are three typical patterns of the direction
in which (A(t); B(t)) moves over time, depending on the international pair of pollution
reduction rates ( A(t); 

B(t)):
First, in the region of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0), there are no technological advances by
assumption (a). Namely, since both countries do not engage in the pollution-reducing
activity, they do not learn anymore. Here (A(t); B(t)) never moves and is stable. Sec-
ond, in the regions of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (pA; 0) and (1; 0) ((

A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; pB) and
(0; 1)), only country A (B) engages in the abatement activity. Therefore, only A(t)
(B(t)) decreases over time by assumption (a). This fact is indicated by the left ar-
row (down arrow) within those regions. Third, in the region of ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (1; qB)
(( A(t); 

B(t)) = (qA; 1)), both countries make the environmental investment. As the
pollution reduction rate in country A (B) is higher, i.e.,  A(t) > 

B(t) (

A(t) < 

B(t)),
the pollution level in country A (B), i.e., A(t) (B(t)), decreases more sharply than the
pollution level in country B (A), i.e., B(t) (A(t)) through learning by doing. This comes
from the assumption (b) and the equilibrium property that  i (s)i(s)Yi(s) monotonically
increases with  i (s): This is indicated by the long left arrow and the shorter down arrow
for the region of (1; qB) and the long down arrow and the shorter left arrow for the region
of (qA; 1). All seven phases are characterized, proving the lemma.
By means of the phase diagram in Figure 2, we can determine the direction in which
international environmental friendliness, (A(t); B(t)); advances over time and roughly
trace a dynamic path for any initial point. A typical trajectory, starting from point K0;
is illustrated by dotted arrows in Figure 2.
4.2 Environmental Leadership Dynamics
Take an example path starting from K0 in Figure 2, in which A(0) < B(0): Along an
equilibrium path from K0; as can be shown by using the phase diagram, environmental
11In Figure 2, A(t) (B(t)) is measured along the horizontal (vertical) axis, and the time index t is
omitted for simplicity.
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leadership may shift between the two countries. At rst, country A is the leader with
lower A(t) and it retains its environmental leadership in the subsequent periods 1   4:
Along the equilibrium path, the environmental leadership internationally shifts in period
5; country B becomes a new environmental leader.
We can formally identify this possibility of environmental leaderships shift. Recall
that by (9) and Figure 1, the equilibrium environmental policy pair is ( A(0); 

B(0)) =
(0; 0); (0; pB(0)) ; (0; 1); or (qA(0); 1): Dene a new threshold value ~ such that 2~ =
1=("L (1 + ~)): See Figure 3. If an initial point exists in the blue region in Figure 3 (a),
like point k0; the environmental friendliness pair (A(t); B(t)) will eventually fall below
the 45 degree line. The blue region is characterized by
B(0) > A(0) 2 (~; ^): (13)
See Figure 3 (b), in which the red region corresponds to
B(0) > A(0)  ^: (14)
If the pair (A(t); B(t)) exists such as k00 in the red region in Figure 3 (b), it may
eventually either fall below the 45 degree line or move to the blue region of (13). This is
guaranteed by assuming that the extent of technological progress that takes place within
a period is not too large, i.e., there exists some  > 0 such that (; t) < .12 Given this
assumption, if (14) holds, we can show that environmental leadership will eventually shift
internationally.
Taking into account (13) and (14) with Theorem 1, we have the following.
Proposition 1 The environmental leadership of a country may be temporary. Suppose
A(0) < B(0): If the extent of technological progress taking place within a period is not
too large, so long as
A(0) > ~; (15)
the environmental leadership initially retained by country A will eventually shift to the
initial lagging country B:
To explain why such a reversal of environmental leadership can take place under (15),
let us review our result on a step-by-step basis. Initially, country A is an environmentally
leading country with A(0) < B(0): As the environmentally lagging country B is more
polluting, it requires domestic rms to reduce pollutants more by setting a higher rate
of pollution reduction, i.e.,  B(0) > 

A(0) (Theorem 1).
13 Through the learning-by-
doing process, the lagging country Bs technology thus becomes environmentally friendly
more rapidly than the leading country As technology does. If the technology of the
leading country A were initially environmentally friendly enough to satisfy A(0) < ~, the
world economy would get to the equilibrium without any pollution reduction ( i (t) = 0).
However, as the leading country As technology is initially not very environmentally
friendly (A(0) > ~), the lagging countrys friendliness continues to increase until it
exceeds the leading countrys. Therefore, if (15) holds, the environmental leadership
eventually shifts internationally.
12If a step of technological progress was very large, (A(t); B(t)) might immediately jump into the
grey region of (0; 0).
13Recall that this does not necessarily imply the lagging country B taking a stricter environmental
regulation because it can generate a larger amount of pollution emissions.
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In a nutshell, the environmentally lagging country may learn to produce in an environ-
mentally friendly way faster than the leading country since the lagging country reduces
more pollution emissions by setting a higher pollution reduction rate, which enhances
learning by doing. This creates a possibility of the shift of environmental leadership
between countries.
What happens after that? The answer to this question is that the leadership shift
may occur once again. See Figure 2, in which K5 moves horizontally in the subsequent
period 6. Imagine that K5 crosses the 45 degree line, so the technological leadership
shifts internationally again in period 6: However, in the long run, the world economys
friendliness pair (A(t); B(t)) eventually converges to the grey region in Figure 2, in
which ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) and (A(t); B(t)) stays constant. Denote by (

A; 

B)
the point that (A(t); B(t)) nally reaches in the grey region. Whether A > 

B or
A < 

B is not determinate, depending in a complex fashion on the initial friendliness
levels (A(0); B(0)): That is, which country ultimately becomes an environmentally lead-
ing country is indeterminate. This indeterminacy essentially comes from the symmetry
between the countries (which di¤er only in i(t)). In any case, our message here is
that the environmental leadership retained by a country at some point of time might be
intrinsically impermanent.
Our theoretical result seems consistent with empirical observations. A transition
of the key variable in our model, i(t), which indicates the amount of emissions form
producing one unit of a good (environmental friendliness of technology) in country i,
may correspond to that of CO2 emissions per 1 US dollar (USD) GDP adjusted by PPP,
provided that composition of economic activity is constant in the country. According
to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Indicators of the United Nations, many
countries including developed and emerging economies reduced their CO2 emissions per 1
USD GDP (PPP) since the 1990s.14 For instance, emissions per 1 USD GDP in 1991 were
0.430kg in Germany and 0.325kg in Japan but those in 2010 were 0.272kg in Germany
and 0.297kg in Japan.15 Emissions per 1 USD GDP in Poland were 1.176kg in 1990
and 0.479kg in 2010, while those in Bulgaria were 1.155kg in 1990 and 0.515kg in 2010.
Emissions per 1 USD GDP in 1992 were 1.730kg in China and 1.408kg in Russia, while
those in 2000 were 1.011kg in China and 1.237kg in Russia. The values are reversed again
between them because in 2010, they were 0.908kg in China and 0.863kg in Russia. Thus,
our result might explain that a country with initially high emissions per 1 USD GDP
(PPP) reduces the emissions signicantly compared with other countries with initially
low emissions per 1 USD GDP (PPP). Although this explanation is not more than just
a suggestive interpretation of our result, one would think that our analysis on a dynamic
path of (A(t); B(t)) is relevant to one of the well known indicators (the MDG indicators).
4.3 Which Country Prevails? The Role of Country Heterogene-
ity
So long as countries are essentially identical, in the analysis above, which country prevails
is not determined. A fundamental question arises as to which country becomes the
ultimate environmental leader in the long run. In this subsection, we will give an answer
to this question by allowing for country heterogeneity.
14See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=788.
15In the United Kingdom, emissions per 1 USD GDP were 0.443kg in 1991 and 0.242kg in 2010.
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Suppose that one country is relatively aware of environmental quality, say country
A; and the other has a large amount of e¤ective labor (i.e., population times their labor
productivity), say country B: Denote as Li and "i the e¤ective labor and environmental
awareness of country i, where i = A, B: Then, "A  "B and LA  LB: Equilibrium
optimal policies are shown in Figure 4. (See Appendix B for mathematical details.)
Figure 4 (a), by setting "A = "B and LA < LB; shows how the di¤erence in in-
ternational e¤ective labor sizes a¤ects the equilibrium policies. Dene ^i such that
^i = 1=("iLi (1 + ^i)): Because ^B is lower than ^A in this case, the stable region (0; 0)
is twisted with a rightward bias. In fact, as LB increases, ^B decreases and ^A increases.
Therefore, when country Bs e¤ective labor LB is very large, A > B (where coun-
try B is the leader) holds almost everywhere in the stable region (0; 0): Given that the
world economy eventually moves into the stable region (0; 0), we can say that a county
with large e¤ective labor is more likely to eventually obtain the environmental leadership
(A > B).
Remark 1 A country that has a large amount of e¤ective labor tends to eventually be-
come an environmental leader in the long run.
The implication of Remark 1 is as follows. A large amount of e¤ective labor im-
plies huge potential pollution emissions. Thus, the government of country B tends to
implement a higher rate of pollution reduction for a longer time that promotes the tech-
nological progress as a by-product in the long-term. Therefore, given its large e¤ective
labor, country B may tend to obtain environmental leadership eventually, even if it is
initially an environmentally lagging country.
Heterogeneity of environmental awareness, "A > "B; determines which country nally
retains the environmental leadership. See Figure 4 (b), with the denition of  where
2(1+)  1="A; which means  = ("A) with 0("A) < 0: Starting from any point in the
red-box region (where B(t) <  and B(t) < A(t)); B(t) < A(t) holds in the long run.
Outside the red-box region, any path eventually converges to a state with B(t) > A(t);
where country A is the leading country. As, by 0("A) < 0; the red-box region becomes
smaller as "A increases, we have the following statement.
Remark 2 A country that has greater awareness of environmental quality tends to be-
come an environmental leader in the long run.
The implication of Remark 2 is straightforward. Given its greater environmental
awareness "A; country A is more likely to adopt a higher pollution reduction rate, abating
more emissions. It follows that the learning-by-doing e¤ect works more actively in country
A, which would advance environmental technology in country A faster (decreasing A(t)
faster than B(t)).
5 Global Pollution Dynamics
In this section, we investigate how global pollution changes over time. In doing so, we
assume that the two countries di¤er only in their technological friendliness; A(t) < B(t).
Using (5), (9), and (10), we will elaborate how global pollution, E(t) = EA(t) + EB(t);
changes over time in each stage of environmental development.
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Stage I: Consider an earlier stage of environmental technology development, in which
both countries set a positive rate of pollution reduction, ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (qA(t); 1) : As
shown in the phase diagram in Figure 2, environmental technology advances in both
countries; both A(t) and B(t) decreases over time. By (5), (9), and (10), we have
E(t) =
1
2" (1 + A(t))
 e1A(t) as 1"L(1+A(t)) < A(t) : (16)
We nd that, during this early stage (stage I), global pollution increases as environmental
technologies in the leading country advance. That is, E(t) increases as A(t) decreases.
Stage II: The second stage is with ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 1) ; where technological
progress takes place only for the lagging country. Only B(t) decreases over time. Global
emissions in this case can be calculated as
E(t) =
A(t)L
2
 e2A(t) as 1"L(1+B(t)) < A(t) < 1"L(1+A(t)) : (17)
While the leading country generates a constant amount of pollution, the lagging country
reduces all of its pollution emissions. Therefore, it is clear that global pollution is kept
constant. That is, E(t) never changes while B(t) decreases over time.
A fundamental question is whether global pollution rises or declines in the period
of regime switching from stages I to II. The answer is not clear and global pollution
depends on the extent of technological progress that takes place within that period.
Suppose that regime switching from stages I to II occurs from periods t to t + 1. If the
extent of technological progress in the leading country, i.e., A(t); is reasonably large,
global pollution is be reduced with this regime switching, E(t+ 1) < E(t).16
Stage III: In a more advanced stage of environmental technology development with
( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; pB(t)) ; as in stage II, only B(t) decreases over time. We can obtain
E(t) =
1
2" (1 + B(t))
 e3A(t) as A(t) < 1"L(1+B(t)) < A(t) + B(t) ; (18)
global emissions start to increase again. In a regime switch from stages II to III, global
pollution necessarily increases.17
Stage IV: Finally, if both countries have a su¢ ciently clean technology such that if
A(t) + B(t) <
1
"L(1+B(t))
, they do not need pollution reduction; ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) :
In this case, global pollution is given by
E(t) =
(A(t) + B(t))L
2
 e4(t) as A(t) + B(t) < 1"L(1+B(t)) : (19)
This implies that global pollution emissions become constant in the long-run steady state
(i.e., in stage IV), given that A(t) and B(t) are constant due to ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (0; 0) :
In a regime switch from stages III to IV, using a simple numerical example, we can show
that global emissions are reduced if technological progress for the lagging country, B(t);
is reasonably large.
We have shown the following proposition from the above analysis.
16To verify this, consider a numerical example with L = 0:5 and " = 0:5: Assume (A(t); B(t)) =
(1:75; 4:5) and (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1; 3:5) : Then, regime switching occurs from t to t + 1; noting
(16) and (17). Furthermore, E(t) = 0:36364 declines to E(t+ 1) = 0:25:
17Suppose that the world goes from stages II to III in periods t+ 1 to t+ 2: By (17) and (18), noting
A(t+ 1) = A(t+ 2) in stage II, we can easily verify E(t+ 1) < E(t+ 2).
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Proposition 2 (Global Pollution Dynamics) The global pollution E(t) may uctu-
ate over time in the process of environmental technological progress but nally converges
to the constant level in the long-run steady state.
Proposition 2 shows that the level of global pollution emissions becomes constant in
the long-run. However, whether the long-run level of global pollution emissions is lower
than the initial level is not clear in general; it can be either higher or lower potentially.
We will think of two typical numerical examples;18 see Appendix C for details.
Figure 5 (a) illustrates the rst example (a).19 In this case, the reversal of environ-
mental leadership does not take place, and global emissions uctuates and eventually
increases up to the level higher than the initial level. This implies that the level of global
pollution E(t) may increase over time, despite the fact that environmental technology
monotonically advances in both countries. The intuition behind the result is as follows.
Changes in pollution can be decomposed into two fundamental forces: scale and technique
e¤ects. As shown in Grossman and Krueger (1993), the scale e¤ect measures the increase
in pollution that would be generated if the economy was simply scaled up, holding all
else constant; the technique e¤ect captures reduction in pollution caused by a fall in
emissions intensity, holding all else constant. In our model, a higher pollution reduction
rate in the early stage of environmental technology development, accompanied by a larger
amount of pollution reduction, induces rapid technological progress (through learning by
doing), which reduces pollution (the technique e¤ect). As technological progress enables
a country to save labor input used for abatement activity, more labor can be employed
in production of the good. This causes an increase in pollution (the scale e¤ect). Ex-
ample (a) suggests that the scale e¤ect in some cases may play a dominant role, where
environmental technology advances, but emissions also increase.20
Figure 5 (b) describes the second example (b).21 In this example, the environmental
leadership shifts between countries, where global pollution uctuates at rst, but nally
declines to the lowest level. This implies that the long-run amount of global pollution
can be lower than the initial amount. This is essentially because, in our model, the
technology in the lagging country advances more rapidly than that in the leading country
as a result of the policy game with international strategic interactions. Technologies in
the two countries advance considerably and similarly if both countries experience the
state of a lagging country for more periods. This implies that technological progress may
be more balanced between the two countries as an international reversal of environmental
leadership occurs more frequently.
Remark 3 The long-run level of global pollution emissions can be either lower or higher
than the initial level. In equilibrium where the environmental leadership shifts interna-
tionally (does not shift internationally), the long-run global pollution emissions may tend
to be lower (higher) than their initial level.
18In both examples, we set " = L = 0:5 and take (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) as an initial state.
19We consider the following specic learning-by-doing function: (i(t); k(t)) = (2; 0:75) if 

i (t) >
k(t) > 0 and (2; 0) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with assumptions (a) and (b).
20Given that the scale e¤ect dominates, an increase in global pollution over time implies that production
increases over time. We can easily verify that in terms of utility, the increase in the output dominates
the increase in pollution. As environmental technology improves, utility increases over time. This would
suggest an important role for a nice balance of production (economic growth) and the environment.
21We consider the following learning-by-doing function: (i(t); k(t)) = (1; 0:3) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) > 0
and (1; 0) if i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with assumptions (a) and (b).
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Finally, it is worth pointing out that our analysis could explain the underlying cause
of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). The EKC is a hypothesized inverted U-
shaped relation between environmental quality and economic development.22 In our
model, production will increase over time because environmental technology advances
through learning-by-doing e¤ects. Our results shown in Figure 5 suggest that there can
be an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution and time (or economic growth).
This implies that balanced technological progress between countries could be a key factor
for the EKC relationship in the world economy.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we constructed a simple two-country model with global pollution and
endogenous technological progress induced by learning by doing. We characterized the
structure of equilibria and the dynamic environmental policies that achieve technological
progress. Long-term global emissions and the dynamic path of environmental friendliness
are related to the initial environmental friendliness, environmental awareness, and learn-
ing process between countries. Our ndings underscore the importance of considering the
implications of technological progress in a multicountry framework.
We have built a simple general equilibrium model to shed some light on the issue of
environmental regulations and their e¤ects on the learning by doing process and global
emissions. It is certainly worthwhile to build alternative models to more deeply under-
stand the mechanism in our paper. The following are in particular worth mentioning
and have been left for future research. First, our analysis does not consider dynamic
optimization because we treat pollution as a ow to derive clear-cut results. However, it
is interesting to investigate the issue when pollution is a stock variable. Second, techno-
logical progress might be reinforced if the national government considers not only nega-
tive externalities caused by pollution, but also positive externalities of learning-by-doing.
Third, the channel for knowledge growth could be by R&D investments as well as learning
by doing. Last, there is no terms-of-trade e¤ect because we have used a one-good model.
Environmental regulations are a¤ected by terms-of-trade e¤ects, which could change the
long-term pace of technological progress.
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Appendix A
Wewill show the derivations for (9). Assume i(t) > j(t): By substituting ( i (t); 

i (t)) =
(ei(t); 0) and ( A(t); 

B(t)) = (1; ej(t)) into (6) and (7), we have
ei(t) =
"L  1
i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  "Lj(t)

"L+

1
1+i(t)
  "Lj(t)
 (A1)
and
ej(t) =
"L  1
j(t)
1
1+j(t)
"L+ 1
1+j(t)
; (A2)
respectively. With (A1) and (A2), noting 0  ei(t)  1 and 0  ej(t)  1 would imply
(9), given the denitions of pi(t) and qi(t):
Appendix B
We will show the derivations for Figure 4 (the case with heterogeneous countries).
The reaction function becomes
 i (t; 

j(t)) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if "i  11+i(t)

i(t)Li +
j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
Lj
 1
ei(t) otherwise
1 if "i  11+i(t)

j(t)(1 j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
Lj
 1 ; (B1)
where
ei(t) =
"iLi   1i(t)

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"iLj

"iLi +

1
1+i(t)
  j(t)(1 

j (t))
1+j(t)j (t)
"iLj
 : (B2)
Dene ^i such that ^i  1"iLi(1+^i) : Then, using (B1) and (B2), the equilibrium policy
pair goes to
( i (t); 

j(t)) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(0; 0) if A(t)LA + B(t)LB  mini2fA;Bg
n
1
"i(1+i(t))
o
(pi(t); 0) if
min
n
"i
"j

i(t) +
"i "j
"i

; 1
"iLj(1+i(t))
o
> j(t)  1"iLj(1+i(t))   i(t)LiLj
(1; 0) if ^j > j(t) > 1"iLj(1+i(t))
(1; qj(t)) if "i"j

i(t) +
"i "j
"i

> j(t)  ^j
; (B3)
where
pi(t) =
"iLi  1i(t)

1
1+i(t)
 j(t)"iLj

"iLi+

1
1+i(t)
 j(t)"iLj
 and qi(t) = "iLi  1i(t) 11+i(t)"iLi+ 11+i(t) : (B4)
It is straightforward to illustrate Figure 4 by using the above equilibrium conditions.
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We will explain numerical calculations for Remark 3 in detail. In both examples,
we think of (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) as an initial point, which ensures stage I
for country A as a leading country, noting (16). Set " = L = 0:5: Then, we calculate
E(t  1) = 1
1+2:5
' 0:28571:
Example (a): Technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) = (2; 0:75) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) >
0 with (2; 0) if  i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with the learning rules that we
assume.
As (A(t  1); B(t  1)) = (2:5; 7:5) ; the world is in stage I by (16), and E(t  
1) = 1
1+2:5
' 0:28571: Given the values of i(t) assumed, it goes to (A(t); B(t)) =
(1:75; 5:5) : By (16), the world is also in stage I and we have E(t) = 1
1+1:75
' 0:36364:
In the subsequent period t+ 1; it becomes (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1; 3:5) : Noting (17),
the world shifts to stage II in period t + 1: We can calculate E(t + 1) = 0:25: Next,
(A(t+ 2); B(t+ 2)) = (1; 1:5) satises the inequality condition in (18), so it is in stage
III and E(t+ 2) = 1
1+1:5
= 0:4: Finally, it goes to (A(t+ 3); B(t+ 3)) = (1; 0:5) ; which
satises (19). In period t + 3; the world moves to the terminal stage IV and we can
calculate E(t+3) = 1:5
4
= 0:375;which is higher than the initial level E(t  1) ' 0:28571:
Example (b): Technological progress follows (i(t); k(t)) = (1; 0:3) if 

i (t) > 

k(t) >
0 and (1; 0) if  i (t) > 

k(t) = 0; which is consistent with the learning rules that we
assume.
Through the assumed process of technological progress, stage I continues in pe-
riods t to t + 2: (A(t); B(t)) = (2:2; 6:5) ; (A(t+ 1); B(t+ 1)) = (1:9; 5:5) ; and
(A(t+ 2); B(t+ 2)) = (1:6; 4:5) while E(t) = 11+2:2 ' 0:3125; E(t + 1) = 11+1:9 '
0:34483; and E(t + 2) = 1
1+1:6
' 0:38462: In periods t + 3 and t + 4; it goes to (1:3; 3:5)
and then (1:3; 2:5) ; in which case the world is in stage II noting (17). Then, E(t+ 3) =
E(t + 4) = 1:3
4
= 0:325: Next, (A(t+ 5); B(t+ 5)) = (1:3; 1:5) ; which satises (18).
It is stage III and E(t + 5) = 1
1+1:5
= 0:4: In period t + 6; it goes to (1:3; 0:5) ; in
which country B is a new leading country. An analogous inequality to that in (18),
B(t) <
1
"L(1+A(t))
< A(t) + B(t); is satised, so that the world is in stage III,
E(t + 6) = 1
1+1:3
= 0:43478: Finally, it goes to (A(t+ 7); B(t+ 7)) = (0:3; 0:5); in
which the leadership internationally shifts again. Country A regains the leadership and
it satises (19), stage IV. Then, we calculate E(t + 7) = 0:8
4
= 0:2; which is lower than
the initial level E(t  1) ' 0:28571
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Figure 1: Seven regions of equilibrium policy on a             plane BA κκ −
Figure 2: Phase diagram 
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Figure 3 (a): Environmental leapfrogging  
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Figure 3(b): Environmental leapfrogging 
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Figure 5 (a): Global pollution without environmental leapfrogging  
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Figure 5 (b): Global pollution with environmental leapfrogging  
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